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O'NEIL v. BAINE: APPLICATION OF MIDDLE-LEVEL
SCRUTINY TO OLD-AGE CLASSIFICATIONS *
Determination of the role that older citizens should play is a
perplexing problem for contemporary society. In pre-industrial
cultures, those advanced in age have retained an active societal role
and have been looked to for guidance and wisdom; but it has be-
come commonplace in modem industrial societies for older workers
to retire and live on the income from social security and pension
plans. It is paradoxical that "early" retirement 1 is encouraged and
mandatory retirement plans are tolerated in a country such as the
United States that espouses the work ethic.
Over the years, courts have almost uniformly rejected chal-
lenges to mandatory retirement plans and have generally accepted
* After this Comment was put into galley form, the Supreme Court decided
Vance v. Bradley, 47 U.S.L.W. 4176 (Feb. 22, 1979), in which it upheld different
retirement ages for the federal Foreign Service and Civil Service. Invoking minimal
equal protection scrutiny, the Court reversed a three-judge district court, Bradley v.
Vance, 436 F. Supp. 134 (D.D.C. 1977), and held that Congress could rationally
have concluded that the retirement ages of 60 for Foreign Service employees and 70
for Civil Service employees were justified by differing job requirements. Justice
Marshall would have applied the middle-level test that he advocated in Murgia.
Vance v. Bradley, 47 U.S.L.W. at 4182 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Although the
appellees asserted that the relevant statute discriminated between those over 60 and
those younger, the Court dismissed this issue, holding that because the appellees had
abandoned the claim in the district court the Supreme Court need not decide the
issue. Id. 4177 n.10, 4181 n.27. But see id. 4182 (Marshall, J., dissenting). By
thus sidestepping the underlying (and more difficult) question whether a mandatory
retirement age of 60 is itself constitutionally permissible for these kinds of occupa-
tions, and focusing instead on the difference between the two services, the Court
failed to address squarely the issue discussed in this Comment. Nevertheless, the
Court noted that it found no merit in such a claim. Id. 4181 n.27. Insofar as it
relied on either the holding or the reasoning of Murgia for this conclusion, Bradley
is subject to the criticisms of that case made in this Comment.
"'Early" retirement means voluntary retirement according to an established
pension plan before the customary retirement age. A social policy that encourages
"early" retirement is not without its costs:
The individual who loses his job due to the operation of a mandatory re-
tirement provision experiences loss of income, status, and social orientation.
There exist taxing psychological costs as well, since found leisure is, in
many instances, an unsatisfactory alternative to the retention of meaningful
employment. Finally, apart from the cost to the individual victimized by
mandatory retirement, society suffers as well since it must forego the bene-
fits of currently wasted productive capacity and must instead bear the
burden of the increased cost of supporting retired and unemployed indi-
viduals who in many instances, are both physically and mentally prepared
to continue as productive members of labor's work force.
Note, Defeat of the Constitutional Challenge to Mandatory Retirement, Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 8 U. TOL. L. REv. 764, 767 (1977) (footnotes
omitted).
(798)
O'NEIL v. BAINE
such plans as a reasonable way to accomplish the legitimate goals of
promoting competence and efficiency and providing a path of ad-
vancement for younger workers.
2
Prior to 1976, the Supreme Court had held that mandatory
retirement plans did not present a substantial federal constitutional
question.3 Then, in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,
the Court implicitly rejected this position. Invoking minimal equal
protection scrutiny, it upheld a Massachusetts law that required
state police officers to retire at age fifty. Because the lowest level
of scrutiny was used, the Court did not examine the merits of the
arguments of those opposed to mandatory retirement; rather, it
found the state's purposes legitimate and its means a rational, if
imprecise, way of achieving the specified legislative goals.5
O'Neil v. Baine provides an opportunity to evaluate the sound-
ness of the Murgia decision when extended to non-physical occupa-
tions. In O'Neil, the Missouri Supreme Court upheld a state law
requiring magistrates to retire at age seventy.7 Reversing the judg-
2 Occupations in which mandatory retirement plans have been upheld include:
university professors, Weiss v. Walsh, 324 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 461
F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1129 (1973); schoolteachers, Cook-
son v. Lewistown School Dist. #1, 351 F. Supp. 983 (D. Mont. 1972); park
workers, Talbot v. Pyke, 533 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1976); hospital workers, Armstrong
v. Howell, 371 F. Supp. 48 (D. Neb. 1974); and state judges, Rubino v. Ghezzi,
512 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1975); Boughton v. Price, 70 Idaho 243, 215 P.2d 286
(1950); Nelson v. Miller, 25 Utah 2d 277, 480 P.2d 467 (1971); Aronstam v.
Cashman, 132 Vt. 538, 325 A.2d 361 (1974).
Typical of the above opinions is Weiss v. Walsh in which the court noted:
Notwithstanding great advances in gerontology, the era when advanced
age ceases to bear some reasonable statistical relationship to diminished
capacity or longevity is still future. It cannot be said, therefore, that age
ceilings upon eligibility for employment are inherently suspect, although
their application will inevitably fall injustly in the individual case. If the
precision of the law is impugnable by the stricture of general applicability,
vindication of the exceptional individual may have to attend the wise dis-
cretion of the administrator.
324 F. Supp. at 77. This Comment will argue that such a low-level rationality test
may no longer be appropriately applied to old-age classifications such as mandatory
retirement. See text accompanying notes 36-61 infra.
3 See, e.g., Cannon v. Guste, No. 74-3211 (E.D. La. May 5, 1975), aff'd, 423
U.S. 918 (1975); Weisbrod v. Lynn, 383 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1974), af'd, 420
U.S. 940 (1975); McIlvaine v. Pennsylvania, 454 Pa. 129, 309 A.2d 801 (1973),
appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 986 (1974); Campbell v. Aldrich, 159 Ore. 208, 79 P.2d
257, appeal dismissed, 305 U.S. 559 (1938). The Court in these cases either sum-
marily affirmed or dismissed for want of a substantial federal question lower court
decisions on mandatory retirement plans.
4427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
5Id. 316.
6 568 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1978).
7 The statute states, in relevant part: 'Except as otherwise provided in this
section, . . . magistrate judges, probate judges, and probate ex-officio magistrate
judges shall retire at the age of seventy years .... .. " Mo. ANx. STAT. § 476.458
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ment of the trial court, the state supreme court held that the
statute violated neither the equal protection nor the due process
clauses, 8 even though it recognized that Judge O'Neil's age "has not
lessened his legal abilities" and that he "is competent both physically
and mentally, that his health is generally good, that he is very com-
petent and that he desires to continue to serve the public." 9
In so doing, the court relied heavily on the framework established
by the Supreme Court in Murgia and followed by other courts in
subsequent cases.'"
This Comment will examine Murgia and its legacy and sug-
gest that the constitutional principles of that case, if sound at all,
should not be extended beyond its special facts. Because maximum
age classifications are analogous to others in which the Supreme
Court has invoked a middle-level equal protection scrutiny, this
level of scrutiny and not the minimal scrutiny of Murgia should be
used in this area generally. Applying the middle-level test, the
Comment argues that the mandatory retirement scheme upheld in
O'Neil violates the equal protection clause."
I. Murgia AND ITS LEGACY
In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,12 the Supreme
Court reversed a district court 13 and upheld a state requirement
that state police retire at age fifty.14 Declining to find age-based
(1) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1979). This statute seems to have been required by the
state constitution. See Mo. CONST., art. V, § 30 (1970) (amended by Mo. CONST.,
art. V, § 26 (1976)) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1979).
8 568 S.W.2d at 768.
9 Id. 763.
'0 See text accompanying notes 21-32 infra.
IIJudge O'Neil (and others who have challenged mandatory retirement) set
forth two contentions in addition to his equal protection argument: he argued that
the requirement denied him due process and also that it created an irrebuttable
presumption. This Comment is limited to a discussion of the equal protection
argument. It should be noted, however, that the O'Neil court said of the due
process approach: "The due process argument is similar to the equal protection one;
the two are closely intertwined. If mandatory retirement is constitutionally permis-
sible and is not a violation of equal protection then respondent is not deprived of
any due process rights." Id. 767-68.
12 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
'3 Murgia v. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement, 376 F. Supp. 753 (D. Mass.
1974), rev'd per curiam, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
14 In addition to being required to retire at age 50, uniformed state officers
were required to pass a comprehensive physical examination until age 40. "After
that, until mandatory retirement at age 50, uniformed officers . . . [were required
to] pass annually a more rigorous examination, including an electrocardiogram and
test for gastro-intestinal bleeding." Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 311 (1976) (per curiam).
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classifications suspect 'I or the right to work fundamental,' the
Court instead applied a low-level rationality test.17 In reaching its
decision, the Court noted the existence of a legitimate state pur-
pose, that of assuring the physical preparedness of the police force.
Observing that "physical ability generally declines with age," it
concluded that the mandatory retirement plan was rationally re-
lated to that goal.'
8
15 See notes 38 & 39 infra & accompanying text.
'6 According to the Supreme Court, its prior decisions "give no support to the
proposition that a right of governmental employment per se is fundamental:' Massa-
chusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam)
(citing San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)).
At least one commentator disagrees with the Court. Noting that the Court has re-
peatedly recognized the right to engage in a lawful occupation as among the liberties
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, Professor Abramson claims that
despite repeated opportunities to do so, the right to earn a living has never
explicitly been relegated to mere minimum scrutiny by the Supreme Court.
• . . While the elderly are not in the same class as those individuals
classified on the basis of race, they are arguably subject to discrimination
when they are denied an important benefit such as employment. The
Court's decision . . . [that the right to work is not fundamental] dis-
regards the significant nature of the benefits denied and the hardships
which may result.
Abramson, Compulsory Retirement, The Constitution and the Murgia Case, 42 Mo.
L. REv. 25, 49-50 (1977) (citations omitted). To the extent that Professor Abram-
son's argument is valid, it provides additional support for the application of middle-
level scrutiny to mandatory retirement plans.
17For an example of the application of a similar low-level rationality test, see
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). See also note 36 infra & accompany-
ing text.
Is Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1976)
(per curiam). The Supreme Court dearly was more deferential to the state legisla-
ture than was the district court, which also claimed to have invoked the minimum
rationality test. Murgia v. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement, 376 F. Supp. 753, 754
(D. Mass. 1974), rev'd per curiam 427 U.S. 307 (1976). Indeed, the court noted
that "[the rationality test] employs a relatively related standard reflecting the Court's
awareness that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative
task and an unavoidable one.. . . Such action by a legislature is presumed to be
valid." Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (per
curiam). The district court, on the other hand, stated that "to say that a line may
be drawn arbitrarily when there is no readily discernible breaking, or turning point,
does not mean that the line can be drawn anywhere at all." Murgia v. Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement, 376 F. Supp. at 755. In reaching its decision the district court
relied on the following statistics, compiled from Novmeber, 1967 to December, 1973,
showing discharges for non-injury disability:
Age Discharges Age Discharges
40 ............... 3 45 ............... 1
41 ............... 3 46 ............... 3
42 ............... 1 47 ............... 2
43 ............... 1 48 ............... 1
44 ............... 0 49 ............... 0
Total 8 Total 7
Id. 756. In the opinion of the district court these figures "furnish no reason to
suppose that age 50 is within, or even significantly approaching, a range where
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The extent to which Murgia is dispositive of the constitution-
ality of other mandatory retirement laws is, however, open to ques-
tion. The nature of the occupation there under consideration
involved peculiar characteristics of both physical fitness and protec-
tion of public safety.19 The Court noted that the job of police
officer
"requires comparatively young men of vigorous physique.
The nature of the duties to be performed in all weathers
is arduous in the extreme." . . . [T]he purpose of the
[age] limitation was to protect the public by assuring the
ability of state police to respond to the demands of their
jobs.20
These distinguishing characteristics have contributed to the con-
fusion evident in lower court construction of Murgia.
In Vance v. United States,21 an Air Force regulation providing
for dismissal or demotion of overweight enlisted men was at issue.
The regulation operated without regard to the actual effect of
obesity upon job performance. The federal district court viewed
Murgia as limited to specialized professions like the police or armed
forces, and held that, in such instances, "the physical criteria may be
broad and relatively unparticularized." 22
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has similarly
concluded that Murgia is thus limited. In Gault v. Garrison,28
involving mandatory retirement for teachers at age sixty-five, the
court of appeals distinguished between the teaching and law en-
forcement professions in two ways. First, the court recognized that
teaching is a profession in which mental skills are vastly
more important than physical ability. We cannot assume
that a teacher's mental faculties diminish at age 65. On the
contrary, .. . much in the way of knowledge and experi-
changes of conditions warrant a change of treatment. Rather they contradict it."
Id. 756.
19 Indeed, one commentator has noted that Murgia may not have been the best
case to test the constitutionality of mandatory retirement laws because of the age
involved. Cain, Mandatory Retirement: The Murgia Decision and Its Likely Con-
sequences, 3 INDus. GERONTOLOGY 233, 240 (1976).
20 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-15 n.7 (1976)
(per curiam) (quoting from MAss. H. Doc. No. 1582, at 8 (1938)).
21434 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Tex.), aft'd, 565 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1977).
22 Id. 837.
23 569 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. March
6, 1979). The court remanded the case for evidentiary hearings on the state's
purpose and the relationship of the means to that purpose. 569 F.2d at 996-97.
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ence, so helpful to the educational profession, is often
gained through years of practice.
24
Second, the court noted that, because of the peculiar nature of the
policeman's job in Murgia,
failure to perform properly in any given instance could
become a matter of life or death. In contrast, if a teacher
becomes unfit, whether because of age or other factors, it
does not become a matter of such immediacy that there is
no time or opportunity to take appropriate procedural
steps for his or her removal 25
Unlike the Vance and Gault courts,26 however, most courts have
viewed Murgia as uniformly applicable to all mandatory retire-
ment provisions. The reasoning of Murgia has been transplanted
virtually intact to other cases involving the police.27 A challenge
by an attorney to the New York State civil service retirement age
of seventy was rejected on the strength of Murgia.2s Several retire-
ment laws for teachers and other educational employees have passed
the minimum rationality test.2 9 These courts have upheld the
legitimacy of state purposes such as efficiency, economy, 0 adminis-
trative planning, creating job opportunities for younger workers,
aid in planning for retirement, and avoiding individual decisions.31
24 Id. 996. The same argument applies with even more force in regard to
judges.
25 Id. The court continued: "If the procedures normally taken for removal of
an allegedly unfit teacher are used, there is greater assurance that unfit teachers will
be removed while the rest will be able to continue performing their jobs, putting to
use the experience and knowledge gained over the years." Id. If applied to judges,
this reasoning would indicate a greater reliance on impeachment, or other proceed-
ings designed by law to remove incompetent judges, rather than on mandatory re-
tirement. See text accompanying notes 97 & 98 infra.
2 6 In Bradley v. Vance, 436 F. Supp. 134, 136 (D.D.C. 1977), rev'd, 47
U.S.L.W. 4176 (Feb. 22, 1979), a three-judge district court, dealing with a similar
issue, cited Murgia as having applied a minimum rationality test. The Bradley
court, however, seems to have applied a more expansive test similar to the one
actually used by the district court in Murgia. See note 18 supra. At least one
commentator agrees that Murgia applies to only a limited number of cases. See
Abramson, supra note 16, at 51.
2 7 E.g., Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1271-72 (4th Cir. 1977).
28 Johnson v. Lefkowitz, 566 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 47 U.S.
L.W. 3586 (U.S. March 6, 1979).
29 Kain v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 434 F. Supp. 571 (M.D. Pa. 1977); Palmer
v. Ticcione, 433 F. Supp. 653 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). In the latter case, the court noted
that kindergarten teachers must be in excellent physical condition. Id. 655.
80 Johnson v. Lefkowitz, 566 F.2d 866, 869 (2d Cir. 1977), petition for cert.
filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3727 (U.S. April 11, 1978) (No. 77-1444).
31Klain v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 434 F. Supp. 571, 575 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
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The decision of the Missouri Supreme Court in O'Neil v.
Baine32 adopted a similarly broad view of Murgia and thus repre-
sents an excellent opportunity for the Court to resolve the am-
biguities of its holding in Murgia. Although the Court is usually
reluctant to re-examine its recent decisions out of respect for the
principle of stare decisis, this policy should not be dispositive here.
First, the Court has long recognized that adherence to precedent is
less appropriate in cases in which constitutional issues are at stake
than it is in non-constitutional cases.33  Second, the Court has de-
cided only one mandatory retirement age case, Murgia. As pointed
out above,3 4 however, the scope of that case remains undecided and
the Court may appropriately limit it to its special facts. Finally,
the Court was not called upon to consider squarely the applicability
of middle-level scrutiny in the Murgia case.35 In a case such as
O'Neil, therefore, which is distinguishable and in which the new
middle-level approach is expressly argued for, the Court need not
feel bound by Murgia.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION: A MiDDLE-LEVEL TEST
The level of equal protection scrutiny applied to a mandatory
retirement plan or other maximum age classifications can itself de-
termine the ultimate fate of the scheme. Traditionally, the Su-
preme Court has exercised minimal scrutiny when evaluating social
and economic legislation: its inquiry is limited to whether the
statutory scheme is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.3 6
832568 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1978).
33 E.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974). See Monell v. New
York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978).
34 See text accompanying notes 18-25 supra.
35Even though Justice Marshall complained of the Court's mechanical reliance
upon the traditional two-tier approach to equal protection analysis, Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 317-18 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting),
and even though strict scrutiny was urged upon the Court by amici, e.g., Brief of
Lawrence Carter for Appellee as Amicus Curiae at 4-5, Massachusetts Bd. of Re-
tirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), Murgia, himself, argued only for minimal
scrutiny before the high Court. Brief for Appellee at 18-20, Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). Because the court below had granted
him relief on the basis of the weaker test, Murgia v. Massachusetts Bd. of Retire-
ment, 376 F. Supp. 753, 755-56 (D. Mass. 1974), he had no reason to ask for more
from the Supreme Court.
In Vance v. Bradley, 47 U.S.L.W. 4176 (Feb. 22, 1979), the parties also
agreed that the minimum rationality standard was applicable. Id. 4178. Thus, as in
Murgia, the Court was able to avoid deciding the applicability of the middle-level
test advocated here.
3 6See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). The great
discretion given to legislatures was best described by Chief Justice Warren:
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State
[Vol. 127:798
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In its most relaxed form, this test even allows the Court to hypoth-
esize unstated purposes.37 On the other hand, the Court has ex-
ercised strict scrutiny when classifications are inherently suspect 38
(especially racial classifications) or when certain fundamental rights 39
are involved. Under the strict scrutiny test, the Court inquires
whether the legislature has adopted a necessary method to serve a
compelling state interest.40
There has been widespread dissatisfaction with this rigid, two-
tier approach. Justice Marshall, in particular, has complained that
this pigeonholing fails to consider openly "the character of the
classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in
the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that
they do not receive, and the state interests asserted in support of
the classification." 41 New equal protection models have thus been
suggested that give some added scrutiny to classifications based on
immutable individual characteristics.
42
Although it has never explicitly adopted a new standard, the
Burger Court has invoked a middle-level scrutiny in certain cases
legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power
despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (emphasis added).
37 E.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
3sThe Court has defined a suspect class as one that is "saddled with such dis-
abilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process." San Antonio School Dist v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
39 E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting).
40 Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969). The
Court has not consistently applied the same test in all strict scrutiny cases. Compare
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967), with Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134,
144 (1972). For a more complete discussion of the evolution of these standards,
see Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 H-Av. L. REv. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Newer Equal Protection].
41 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
42 Gunther, for example, suggests a means-focused inquiry in all non-strict
scrutiny cases under which the means must substantially further the ends. Purposes
would be actual, not hypothesized, and reasonableness could be judged only by
available evidence. Newer Equal Protection, supra note 40, at 20-21. Nowak pro-
poses a "demonstrable basis" standard: whenever the legislature creates a classifica-
tion treating persons dissimilarly on the basis of some inherent human characteristic
or status other than race or limiting the exercise of a fundamental right, the Court
will validate it only if there is a factually demonstrable rational relationship between
a legitimate state interest and the means chosen. Nowak, Realigning the Standards
of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permis-
sive Classifications, 62 GEo. L.J. 1071, 1093-94 (1974).
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in which classifications are based on human characteristics and
capabilities analogous to those that have been held to be suspect.
43
Although the Court has applied this new standard primarily to
classifications based on gender 44 and illegitimacy,45 it has not con-
fined its application to these two areas. 46 Because the Court has
never admitted using this new approach, however, its precise mean-
ing is unclear. The Court, for example, has indicated that classifi-
cations based on illegitimacy, a non-suspect criterion, should be
judged by the rationality test.47 In a cryptic afterthought, however,
the Court added that this test is not "toothless." 48 The precise
constitutional standard intended by the Court thus remains un-
certain.
The Court first invoked this middle-level scrutiny in Reed v.
Reed,49 in which a statute providing for a mandatory preference
for males as administrators of estates was challenged. Chief Justice
Burger wrote that the classification must bear a fair and substantial
relationship to the ends desired.50 Although the Court recognized
as legitimate the goal of reducing a probate court's workload by
eliminating a class of applicants for admistrator, the Chief Justice
criticized giving "a mandatory preference to members of either sex
over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination
of hearings on the merits, [as] the very kind of arbitrary legislative
choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 51 In this middle area, therefore, classifications de-
signed for administrative convenience and intended to avoid indi-
vidual inquiries are to be treated skeptically.
5 2
Later, the Court gave increased scrutiny to a classification pre-
venting dependent, unacknowledged illegitimate children from re-
48E.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505-06 (1976) (illegitimacy).
44 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971).
45 See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Weber v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
46 See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)
(unrelated individuals in same household).
47 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
48 Id. 510.
49404 U.S. 71 (1971).
5o Id. 76.
51 Id. The Chief Justice added that "whatever may be said as to the positive
values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the choice in this context may not law-
fully be mandated solely on the basis of sex." Id. 76-77.
62 Indeed, a major reason for the different results reached in two recent illegiti-
macy cases, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), and Mathews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 495 (1976), was the provision in the latter for a hearing on the merits for those
illegitimates excluded by the statutory presumptions. Id. 512.
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covering under workmen's compensation laws. In Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co.,53 the Court accepted some state purposes
as legitimate but, without acknowledging it, clearly inquired into
the means adopted to accomplish those purposes. No longer willing
to accept unquestioningly legislative judgment on the rationality of
the means, the Court weighed the professed state interests against
the nature of the personal rights endangered.54
The Court has extended its middle-level scrutiny to classifica-
tions other than gender and illegitimacy. In United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture v. Moreno,5 5 a statute was challenged that
barred the distribution of food stamps to unrelated individuals liv-
ing in the same household. While allowing for some imprecision,
the Court closely examined the means adopted and found that the
classification did not accomplish the acceptable purpose of eliminat-
ing fraud; consequently, the classification was declared invalid.56
The middle-level scrutiny remains a vital if unexplained part
of equal protection analysis. In Craig v. Boren,57 the Court noted
that gender-based classifications must serve important objectives and
be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. It
sharply criticized what it called outdated misconceptions and over-
broad generalizations about the role of females as "loose-fitting"
characterizations that could not support statutes based on their
accuracy.58 In Mathews v. Lucas 59 and Trimble v. Gordon,60 the
Court noted that, though the characteristics of illegitimates are
analogous in many respects to personal characteristics previously
held to be suspect, the analogy is not sufficient to require the most
exacting scrutiny; thus, although strict scrutiny was inappropriate,
the Court noted that the scrutiny clearly should not be "tooth-
less." 61 Thus, when classifications are based upon immutable per-
sonal characteristics, the latitude granted the legislature in defining
the scope of the classification is reduced.
53406 U.S. 164 (1972).
5, Id. 172-76.
55413 U.S. 528 (1973).
56 d. 535-38. Because this degree of scrutiny has normally been invoked sub
silentio, one can only guess at the Court's motives for choosing it over a more re-
laxed scrutiny. Here, it is likely that the Court believed that classifications affecting
access to a basic instrumentality which was inextricably related to enjoyment of
guaranteed liberties, i.e., food, deserved closer scrutiny. The right to work, involved
in retirement cases, would also fit into this category. See note 16 supra.
57429 U.S. 190 (1976).
58 Id. 198-99. See also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207 (1977).
r9 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
0430 U.S. 762 (1977).
61 Id. 767; Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976).
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The classification of individuals using old age as the criterion
is analogous to the others in which middle-level scrutiny has been
invoked. Like women and illegitimates, the elderly are without
power to change the classifying characteristic; old age is an in-
evitable and unalterable fact of the human condition. Further-
more, as will be demonstrated below,62 old age is a characteristic that
"frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute
to society. As a result, statutory distinctions [on this basis] . . . often
have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class . . . to
inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its
individual members." 13 For these reasons, old age classifications
should be examined under the more demanding middle-level test.
III. O'Neil v. Baine: MIDDLE-LEVEL SCRUTINY APPLIED
The middle-level test requires that the means chosen bear a
fair and substantial relationship to a legitimate state purpose. After
identifying the state purposes articulated in O'Neil, the means will
be examined to determine whether they bear the required relation-
ship to those purposes.
In O'Neil v. Baine,4 the Missouri Supreme Court noted the
existence of several purposes underlying the mandatory retirement
age for state judges. First, the policy is designed to assure the
highest caliber of judiciary. Mandatory retirement should "insure
the fitness of the judiciary as a whole and. . insure the continued
competency of the system ... [by] ... attempt[ing] to insure that,
on the whole, only those judges who have the vigor, health and
vitality will carry out the public's work in administering justice." 6r
Second, the state wishes to avoid having to make perplexing individ-
ual determinations of competence and to hold the traumatic hear-
ings necessary for such determinations. 6 Third, mandatory retire-
ment will increase opportunities for other qualified persons to serve
62 See text accompanying notes 72-94 infra.
63 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The language quoted was
applied to gender classifications: although it was used in Frontiero to support the
inclusion of gender among suspect classifications, and thus to trigger strict scrutiny,
it seems equally applicable to classifications demanding only middle-level scrutiny.
This is especially true because the attempt made in Frontiero to include gender
among the suspect classifications seems to have failed, and gender classifications have
been largely examined with only middle-level scrutiny. See Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976).
64568 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1978).
65 Id. 766-67.
66 Id. 767.
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as judges.67  Fourth, the scheme assures predictability and ease in
administration of the judges' pension plans.68
"There could hardly be a higher governmental interest than a
State's interest in the quality of its judiciary." 69 As a method for
attaining this end, however, the imposition of a mandatory retire-
ment age cannot withstand the scrutiny of the middle-level test.70
Although the O'Neil court defended the age limit of seventy as
"about" the time mental processes weaken among many men and
women,7 1 this is not supported by the increasingly large body of
medical research on the aging process. 72  Undeniably, the mental
processes of many older people have declined. Nevertheless, early
gerontological research indicates that any deterioration in cognitive
and psychomotor functions is highly variable across individuals and
is often retardable or reversible. One prominent gerontologist has
suggested that society is at least as important as biology in the aging
process; 73 thus, stereotypical behavior by older people may be a
result of societal discrimination, deprivation of basic satisfactions,
and reduction to an inferior status. Reduced intellectual per-
formance may simply result from an environment that becomes in-
67 Id.
68 Id. Previous cases concerning mandatory retirement laws for judges, see note
2 supra, have not recognized any purposes that are appreciably different from those
outlined above.
69Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 848 (1978)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
7 o Interestingly, Missouri, like most employers with mandatory retirement policies,
believes that high standards can be maintained simply by eliminating older judges.
One observer calls this a policy of removing the "deadwood," which is defined to
consist only of old people: "The 25-year-old incompetent is not so classified; he is
simply a lousy employee. A 45-year-old schoolteacher is not 'deadwood'; rather, she
is an employee with whom the school board is just going to have to live." Eglit,
Another Name for Discrimination, in Debate, Is Compulsory Retirement Constitu-
tional?, Cxv. Lm. REv., Fall 1974, at 87, 91.
71568 S.W.2d at 767.
72 For general discussions of this research as it relates to mandatory retirement,
see Note, The Constitutional Challenge to Mandatory Retirement Statutes, 49 ST.
Join's L. REv. 748, 755-59 (1975); Note, Age Discrimination in Employment:
Correcting a Constitutionally Infirm Legislative Judgment, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1311,
1315-18 (1974). Medical evidence demonstrates that chronological age is not a good
predictor of physiological age. See text accompanying note 81 infra. See also
Kovarsky & Kovarsky, Economic, Medical and Legal Aspects of the Age Discrimina-
tion Laws in Employment, 27 VAND. L. REv. 839, 849 (1974). This article, a
comprehensive treatment in its area, outlines many clinical concomitants of increasing
age, including senile dementia, coronary heart disease, diabetes, neuromuscular dis-
eases, and arthritic disorders. A comprehensive discussion of all the gerontological
research is obviously beyond the scope of this Comment. For a helpful anthology
of research articles, see HANnBooK OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AGiNG (J. Birren & K.W.
Schaie eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK].
73 Palmore, Sociological Aspects of Aging, in BEAvIoR AND ADAPTATION 3w
L.AE L (E. Busse & E. Pfeiffer eds. 1969).
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creasingly inhibiting." It has been suggested that intellectual de-
cline is reversible through training and preventable by continued
exposure to a challenging environment.7 5 This implies that re-
moval of older individuals from their work roles may be an im-
portant factor in any subsequent decline. Furthermore, several
studies suggest that those with a greater intellectual ability earlier
in life are more resistant to decline." Assuming that judges gener-
ally possess better than average intellectual ability, there is even less
foundation for mandatory retirement in their case.
What sometimes appears to be intellectual decline may, in
reality, represent new ways of thinking. Older people may often
simply process information differently from younger ones and may,
thus, compensate for any losses with new strategies. One study,
noting that there is little evidence to support the notion that older
decisionmakers are less facile information processors, found that
they sought and apparently digested large quantities of informa-
tion.77 This practice, the result of years of experience, perhaps
accounts for some slowness at arriving at decisions.78 Indeed, con-
sidering the complexities of the law, it would seem that a judge
would grow more competent over the years as he gains experi-
ence.79 Two gerontologists have noted: "It is important to remem-
ber that the performance of some 70-year-olds [with respect to
learning and information retention] is indistinguishable from that
of younger individuals." s0
Many gerontologists conclude that the aged can maintain both
their psychological and their physical health by remaining active
and involved with society. Sparks, for example, has argued that
society should emphasize experiential aging, which is determined
74 Labouvie-Vief, Hoyer, Baltes, & Baltes, Operant Analysis of Intellectual Be-
havior in Old Age, 17 HUMAN DEv. 259, 266 (1974).
75 Labouvie-Vief & Gonda, Cognitive Strategy Training and Intellectual Per-
formance in the Elderly, 31 J. GERONTOLOGY 327, 331 (1976).
76Botwinick, Intellectual Abilities, in HANDBOOK, supra note 72, at 599-601.
77Taylor, Age and Experience as Determinants of Managerial Information
Processing and Decision Making Performance, 18 Acn. MANAGEMENT J. 74, 180
(1975). See also Rabbitt, Changes in Problem Solving Ability in Old Age, in
HANDBOOK, supra note 72, at 623, in which other characteristics of compensation are
noted, including: recognizing the need to take advice, conserving resources, and
distinguishing between critical and extraneous demands and tasks.
78 This cautiousness may be an example of what is often thought of as the
"wisdom of age," a not undesirable trait for judges.
79 Compare this notion with that raised for teachers in Gault v. Garrison, 569
F.2d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. March 6,
1979). See note 26 supra.
80Arenberg & Robertson-Tchabo, Learning and Aging, in HANDBooK, supra note
72, at 445. See also text accompanying note 89 infra.
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by the quality of interaction with the environment, rather than
chronological aging.81 Because experiential aging is reversible and
controllable, adherence to this concept would reveal that many
who are old chronologically are able to free themselves from con-
straints imposed by the arbitrary dictates of society and thus able
to remain vital and productive.
Researchers have found a positive correlation between high
activity and satisfaction in old age 2 and have uncovered four highly
significant predictors of longevity: mobility, education, occupation,
and employment.83 Furthermore, older workers in physical occu-
pations can compensate for any small capacity deficit with experi-
ence, responsibility, capacity for precision work, low labor turn-
over, and low short-term absence.us
Congressional determinations underlying the recent amend-
ments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")
of 1967 81 also indicate the unsatisfactory nature of old-age classifi-
cations. Perhaps the most important factor underlying the 1978
amendments was the congressional feeling that age-based distinc-
tions like mandatory retirement are unrelated to actual capabilities
and cause great financial and psychological hardship.88 These con-
cerns are apparent in testimony offered in Congressional hearings
on the subject:
81 Sparks, Behavioral Versus Experiential Aging: Implications for Aging, 13
GERONTOLOcIST 15 (1973). But see E. Cum2mG & W. HENRY, GROWING OLD:
Tsm PROCESS OF DISENGAGE.MENT (1961), setting out the rival theory of disengage-
ment Disengagement theory holds that aging causes an inevitable withdrawal of
the individual and society from each other. The result is decreased interaction
between the person and others in his social system.
82 'Palmore, The Effects of Aging on Activities and Attitudes, 8 GERoroLOGrIsT
259 (1968).
83 Palmore & Stone, Predictors of Longevity: A Follow-up of the Aged in
Chapel Hill, 13 GERoNTOLOGIST 88 (1973).
84 Forssman, The Focus is on Elderly Workers, 43 Iur'L J. OccuAmoNA.L
HEALTH & SAFTY 34 (1974).
85 Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (1978) (amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976)).
86 Increasingly, it is being recognized that mandatory retirement based
solely upon age is arbitrary and that chronological age alone is a poor
indicator of ability to perform a job. Mandatory retirement does not take
into consideration actual differing abilities and capacities. Such forced
retirement can cause hardships for older persons through loss of roles and
loss of income. Those older persons who wish to be re-employed have a
much more difficult time finding a new job than younger persons.
H.R. RaP. No. 95-527, Part I, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
HoUsE REPORT]. See also, e.g., Amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967: Hearings on H.R. 65 and H.R. 1115 Before the Subcomm. on
Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1977) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings] (statement of
Rep. Drinan); id. 55 (statement of Rep. Rosenthal).
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In the past aging was thought to be invariably accompanied
by diminution in mental and other capacities. A persons
[sic] abililties [sic] were thought to deteriorate in direct
proportion to their [sic] age. Almost every investigation
that has been undertaken on the topic has shown defini-
tively that chronological age and functional ability are not
related. Aging as a process of wearing out is related to the
concept of biological age, but biological age and chrono-
logical age are not correlative.... The concept that a per-
son at age sixty-five, or for that matter seventy or seventy-
two inexorably has suffered a loss of ability and functional
capacity is completely at variance with known facts ...
There is no rational basis for taking age sixty-five as a
milestone as [sic] either physical or mental capacity. 7
Representative Cohen noted research showing that learning ability
and intelligence do not necessarily decrease with age but may re-
main steady or even increase depending on one's profession, inter-
ests, and health.88 Such research supports the observations of one
gerontologist that intelligence declines much later than commonly
thought. The brain can deteriorate substantially before the ability
to learn is affected; the age associated with loss due to brain de-
terioration varies widely, from age sixty-five to over ninety.8 9 Rep-
resentative Findley observed that defenders of mandatory retire-
ment, rather than offering a principled basis for its support, often
resort instead to stereotypical disparagement of older people, term-
ing them "slow," "prone to sickness," and "unable to be re-
trained." 90 These are the same sort of stereotypes that for years
were offered as justifications for restraints on blacks and women.91
With this background, Congress voted to amend ADEA, raising
the earliest allowable mandatory retirement age to seventy for all
covered non-federal employees and prohibiting mandatory retire-
ment of most federal employees on the basis of age.92  The latter
prohibition was intended to serve as an example for the rest of the
8 7 Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1977: Hearings on S.
1784 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 174 (1977) (statement of A.E. Gunn, J.D., M.D.).
88 House Hearings, supra note 86, at 20 (statement of Rep. Cohen) (citing
Research of R.L. Sprott of the Jackson Laboratories, Bar Harbor, Me.).
89 Green, Age, Intelligence, and Learning, INDus. GERONTOLOGy, Winter 1972,
at 39-40.
90 House Hearings, supra note 86, at 60-61 (statement of Rep. Findley).
91Id.
92 See HousE REPORT, supra note 86, at 7, 11.
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country,93 while the former represents a compromise designed to
allow the Department of Labor to assess the economic impact of
raising the age limit. 4 Thus, congressional action reflects a grow-
ing realization that the impact of many mandatory retirement laws
is arbitrary and devastating, both personally and socially. The con-
clusion to be drawn from the available evidence on aging is thus
clear: a significant segment of society is being victimized by rules
that perpetuate the very stereotypes used to justify the rules in the
first place. Certainly, the Court's holding in Craig v. Boren,95 re-
jecting legislation based upon outdated misconceptions and over-
broad generalizations, is relevant. Similarly, its disapproval in
Reed v. Reed 96 of a mandatory gender preference without indi-
vidual inquiry into ability is also pertinent. Just as it is wrong
to assume a man is more qualified than a woman to administer an
estate, it is wrong to assume that those who have reached a certain
age have decreased mental or other professional capacity. As
pointed out above, this is particularly true in the case of judges
who are presumed to be of above average intellectual capability.
In short, the connection asserted by Missouri to exist between a
mandatory retirement age and the maintenance of a qualified ju-
diciary does not exist.
This leads to the second justification that is given for the state
law involved in O'Neil. The evidence reviewed above implies that
individual determinations of competence rather than mandatory
retirement rules should be used to guard against older judges who
have become incompetent. This conclusion, however, may conflict
with Missouri's desire "to avoid the tedious and often perplexing
decisions" 97 inherent in individualized determinations. For a
serious conflict to exist, of course, it must be assumed that the com-
petence of a sufficient number of judges over seventy would be
questioned and that enough of these would demand a formal de-
termination of competence to burden the state. This assumption
is doubtful, especially when the burden of such determinations is
weighed against the benefit resulting from the continued productiv-
ity of the most experienced members of the judiciary. Even as-
suming that such individual determinations would be administra-
93 124 CONG. REc. H2270 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Hawkins).
94 HoUSE REPORT, =upra note 86, at 7. Most of the economic considerations
that led to this compromise are not applicable to state judges.
95429 U.S. 190 (1976).
96404 U.S. 71 (1971).
97 O'Neil v. Baine, 568 S.W.2d 761, 767 (1978).
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tively inconvenient, however, mere convenience is not sufficient to
justify classifications subject to middle-level scrutiny.98
The third of the state's asserted purposes is also based partially
on administrative convenience. The mandatory retirement age is said
to assure predictability and ease in the administration of pension
plans. Although this is undoubtedly true, the cost must again be
weighed against the savings from those who would continue on the
bench and thus not collect pensions. Nor is this administrative
convenience any more satisfactory as a justification for otherwise
arbitrary classifications under the middle-level test than the previous
one.99 Moreover, there are alternative methods for achieving the
desired administrative convenience. For example, the state might
stop accrual of pension benefits at age seventy. Although the mid-
dle-level test does not require the use of the least restrictive alterna-
tive necessary to further state purposes, 100 the existence of sig-
nificantly less restrictive alternatives does cast doubt on the
substantiality of the relationship between the chosen means and the
desired ends.
Finally, the state's purpose in encouraging younger men and
women to become judges,101 although certainly legitimate, can more
reasonably be served in a way that would be harmonious both with
the goal of a highly competent judiciary and with that of allowing
competent older judges to remain on the bench.1 2 First, the idea
that young attorneys will be unwilling to become judges simply be-
cause they may have to wait longer for the opportunity is flawed.
Becoming a judge is a great honor and challenge; indeed, a pro-
spective judge who is forced to wait may, perhaps, be better quali-
fied because of the added professional experience. Second, as an
alternative to mandatory retirement at some upper age limit, the
98 See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971).
99 Id.
100 See Newer Equal Protection, supra note 40, at 21.
101 This purpose was also advanced by the State of New York in Rubino v.
Ghezzi, 512 F.2d 431-33 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 891 (1975). Congress,
on the other hand, has disavowed the use of mandatory retirement to provide job
opportunities for minorities and women. HousE REPORT, supra note 86, at 3.
102Economists are not at all certain that mandatory retirement in general
creates many job opportunities for younger workers, for only a small percentage of
workers continue working to the retirement age. See generally Schulz, The Eco-
nomics of Mandatory Retirement, 1 INDus. GERONTOLOGY 1 (1974). The experience
of one company with no retirement rule suggests that older workers do not continue
to "hang on." See Howard, Mandatory Retirement: Traumatic Evidence of Age
Discrimination, TkLmx, Nov. 1977, at 46, 48. Older workers may, in fact, create
jobs for others rather than take them away. House Hearings, supra note 86, at
26 (statement of Rep. Roybal).
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state could provide either for terms of service or limited length of
tenure. Under the latter plan, judges of any age would be able to
serve a limited amount of time; this would provide continual
vacancies and assure, if the state so desires, an ongoing influx of
new judges and ideas to the bench. The former scheme would
permit periodic review of judges and allow for termination of those
no longer competent.103 Where judges are elected, the voters
should have the opportunity to return to office or reject any judge;
if one is no longer competent, the voters may refuse to re-elect him.
If a competent judge over seventy seeks election, the voters should
not be arbitrarily denied the chance to elect him. Although the
state's desire to afford judicial opportunities to more attorneys is
legitimate, the existence of these less restrictive alternatives indi-
cates that mandatory retirement lacks a "fair and substantial" rela-
tionship to this goal.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Missouri court
erred in its treatment of O'Neil v. Baine.1°M Under the appropriate
level of scrutiny, the Missouri mandatory retirement law for state
judges does not bear a "fair and substantial relationship" to the
achievement of its purposes.
More generally, mandatory retirement laws for judges based on
old age should be reviewed under the evolving middle-level equal
protection test. For such laws properly to survive, the state would
have to show that there is some generalizable and discernible drop
in performance somewhere "about" the mandatory retirement
age.1 5 If this were so, then the lack of absolute precision in the
103 The procedure by which this review would be carried out would be for the
state to determine. If judges beyond a certain age were, in fact, not being retained
simply because of their age, then equal protection principles would clearly be
violated.
104 568 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1978).
105 Not all age-based classifications are necessarily improper. If there is a
readily identifiable change in some relevant capability around some age, then it is
acceptable to draw an arbitrary line at that age. This is especially true if the
number of people affected is so great that individual evaluations would be impos-
sible. Because of their belief that young people mature and take on more respon-
sibilities in late adolescence, for example, the courts have approved minimum age
limits for service on a grand jury in United States v. Duncan, 456 F.2d 1401 (9th
Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 409 U.S. 814 (1972), and for voting in Oregon
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). Similarly, courts have upheld tax exemption
classifications for parents of children under 19 (or full-time students), Scarangefla
v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 228 (3d Cir. 1969) (dictum), and age limits for
eligibility for induction into the army, Smith v. United States, 424 F.2d 267 (9th
Cir. 1970). The fatal flaw in mandatory retirement laws for judges is that there
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designated age as the cutoff might be justifiable. Given the scien-
tific evidence, however, that tends to show that older people, like
those of any other age group, have a great variety of abilities, the
state's ability to meet this burden is doubtful.
Although this Comment has focused on judges and the recent
Missouri Supreme Court action in O'Neil v. Baine,10 6 it is quite
probable that mandatory retirement is equally unsupportable in
other occupations involving primarily mental skills. Furthermore,
courts might want to re-examine jobs with physical demands, at
least those that do not have the peculiar, life or death, public safety
characteristics of state police, 107 to determine if age-based mandatory
retirement rules are proper there.
In an era that has witnessed the beginnings of a new judicial
attitude to groups such as blacks, 08 women,10 9 and illegitimates 110
that have historically been accorded inferior status in varying de-
grees because of false generalizations and prejudice, the continued
acceptance of a comparable attitude toward older people is curious.
Like members of those other groups, the elderly should receive
the benefits of a skeptical judicial eye when their right to live use-
ful and fulfilling lives is jeopardized by government. Disapproval
of mandatory retirement laws for judges, such as that involved in
O'Neil v. Baine,111 would be an appropriate place to begin this
new approach. The Justices of the Supreme Court, after all, need
not look far to discover that age is not a reliable criterion of mental
decline.
is no such distinct change in relevant capabilities around 65 or 70. Furthermore,
individualized determinations of capability are not nearly so cumbersome as in the
above cases.
1o6 568 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1978).
107 See text accompanying notes 19 & 20 supra.
108 E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
109 E.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
110 E.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
311 568 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1978).
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